Skip to content

Hazards 36 Day Two: Why Root Cause Language Still Misses the Point

Published
Author
Christopher Smith
Reads
787

Day two of IChemE's Hazards 36 put human factors and insurer-side incident trends front and centre, with a sharp warning about blame-focused investigations.

Hazards 36 Day Two: Why Root Cause Language Still Misses the Point

Day two of IChemE's Hazards 36 Process Safety Conference at Old Trafford Cricket Ground in Manchester kept returning to one question: why do people behave the way they do when things go wrong? The two plenaries came at it from different angles, one from human factors and one from the insurance side of onshore energy, and together they made a case that process safety professionals still have work to do on both fronts.

Asking the right question first

Richard Scaife, a chartered occupational psychologist and director of the Keil Centre, opened the day. The Keil Centre provides psychological consultancy and support to industry and government, and Scaife's specialism is putting human factors into every stage of an accident investigation, not bolting them on at the end.

His frustration was with how incidents get reported. Major accident coverage, including high-profile plane and train crash investigations, often lands on a single "root cause" that is a human error or a technical failure. That framing stops the inquiry before it reaches the question that matters: what conditions made those behaviours likely in the first place? "I don't have much hair left, and that is because I've torn most of it out," Scaife said.

The practical problem is data. A thorough investigation depends on witness accounts, and those accounts dry up quickly when people feel the investigation is about their individual conduct. Scaife argued that corporate investigations can have exactly this effect. If staff think they are being singled out, they stop talking candidly, and the investigation loses the detail it needs. His remedy was a psychologically safe culture and a just culture, one that actively encourages people to speak up.

The sharpest point was about scope. Scaife described a patient who died of septicaemia after an operation. The investigation opened with "why did the patient die?", and theatre staff stayed guarded because they believed managers were trying to pin the blame on someone. Only when the question changed to "why was there bacteria in the operating theatre?" did people start talking. That shift surfaced systemic causes that the original framing had buried.

That's the part I'd flag for anyone who runs investigations in a plant. The question you open with decides which evidence you can reach. Ask a "who" question and you get defensive witnesses. Ask a "what conditions" question and you get the information you need to fix the system.

IChemE Fellow Michael Godfrey, who works as a part-time consultant and goes by "that process safety guy" in that role, called Scaife's presentation "absolutely spot on". After nearly four decades in process safety, he said the emphasis on not blaming the operator resonated strongly. "You can't blame the operator, you can't sack the pilot for the accident. You've absolutely got to get to the root causes."

What insurers are seeing at refineries and gas plants

The second plenary came from Nigel Cairns, a chartered engineer at insurer Liberty Specialty Markets. His talk covered recent major accident trends across refining, petrochemicals and gas plants, as seen by the onshore energy insurance market. Insurers see a different slice of risk from operators: they look at losses, downtime and the patterns that recur across many sites.

Cairns put the spotlight on the long-term dominance of the US in business downtime, a pattern that has come under added strain from geopolitics. Before the Strait of Hormuz closure pushed oil and gas production up outside the Middle East, he noted that global refining margins had already doubled between 2015 and 2026. Following the Iran conflict, North American refining utilisation rates have "crept over 95% as a number of oil majors have postponed planned maintenance activities".

That last point deserves attention. Running equipment near its ceiling for long periods leaves less slack for inspection and repair, and deferred maintenance is one of the classic routes by which a process unit drifts toward an incident. Cairns tied this to the wider context: alongside the conflict in Ukraine, he said US refineries have been "operating near maximum capacity for the longest sustained period this century." Throughput pressure and maintenance deferral tend to compound each other, and that's the combination to watch.

Cairns also raised a structural frustration. Operators often don't make improvements unless they are required to. "We can have a very frustrating time, particularly working in North America, where we might suggest an improvement that might make good sense and would pass a cost-benefit analysis, but the site is just not interested because they're not required by OSHA [the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration] to do that."

Here's the thing: a cost-benefit case that stacks up on paper can still lose out if nothing compels action. For engineers making recommendations, that means building the case around the risk reduction and the downtime avoided, not only around the rule book, and documenting it well enough that it survives a budget review.

Diversity on the programme, and what practitioners took away

Eamon Chandler, chair of the Hazards technical committee, reflected on his fourth and final year leading the conference, which saw record attendance. He said this year's event "has been an order of magnitude better than four years ago".

He pointed to the mix of speakers. "I think the plenary speakers have been really much more diverse than we've achieved in the past … I've always wanted to have another human factors speaker, and we got Richard this morning, who was very good. The fresh eyes look from the insurance broker [Cairns] was something different, and we've always wanted to do that." Bringing in a human factors specialist and an insurance view side by side gave the programme two lenses that process safety talks don't always combine.

Committee member Ashley Hynds said the practical value of Hazards is what keeps him coming back. "The things that you learn at Hazards are really applicable. It's not just some concept that might work in 5-10 years' time. It's stuff that's happening now."

Taken together, my read is that the day's two talks pointed the same way. One argued that investigations fail when they chase blame, and the other showed that operating pressure and deferred maintenance are shaping the risk picture right now. Both put the fix in the same place: ask better questions earlier, and make it easy for people to tell you what actually happened.

Source: Christopher Smith · www.thechemicalengineer.com

Related reading